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US-CERT Alerts

Alerts warn about vulnerabilities, incidents, and other security issues that pose a significant risk.
  • Dec 19, 2014 3:39:36 PM
    Original release date: December 19, 2014 | Last revised: December 20, 2014

    Systems Affected

    Microsoft Windows

    Overview

    US-CERT was recently notified by a trusted third party of cyber threat actors using a Server Message Block (SMB) Worm Tool to conduct cyber exploitation activities recently targeting a major entertainment company. This SMB Worm Tool is equipped with a Listening Implant, Lightweight Backdoor, Proxy Tool, Destructive Hard Drive Tool, and Destructive Target Cleaning Tool.

    SMB Worm Tool: This worm uses a brute force authentication attack to propagate via Windows SMB shares. It connects home every five minutes to send log data back to command and control (C2) infrastructure if it has successfully spread to other Windows hosts via SMB port 445. The tool also accepts new scan tasking when it connects to C2. There are two main threads: the first thread calls home and sends back logs (a list of successful SMB exploitations), and the second thread attempts to guess passwords for SMB connections. If the password is correctly guessed, a file share is established and file is copied and run on the newly-infected host.

    Listening Implant: During installation of this tool, a portion of the binaries is decrypted using AES, with a key derived from the phrase "National Football League." Additionally, this implant listens for connections on TCP port 195 (for "sensvc.exe" and "msensvc.exe") and TCP port 444 (for "netcfg.dll"). Each message sent to and from this implant is preceded with its length, then XOR encoded with the byte 0x1F. Upon initial connection, the victim sends the string, "HTTP/1.1 GET /dns?\x00." The controller then responds with the string "200 www.yahoo.com!\x00" (for "sensvc.exe" and "msensvc.exe") or with the string "RESPONSE 200 OK!!" (for "netcfg.dll"). The controller sends the byte "!" (0x21) to end the network connection. This special message is not preceded with a length or XOR encoded.

    Lightweight Backdoor: This is a backdoor listener that is designed as a service DLL. It includes functionality such as file transfer, system survey, process manipulation, file time matching and proxy capability. The listener can also perform arbitrary code execution and execute commands on the command line. This tool includes functionality to open ports in a victim host's firewall and take advantage of universal Plug and Play (UPNP) mechanisms to discover routers and gateway devices, and add port mappings, allowing inbound connections to victim hosts on Network Address Translated (NAT) private networks. There are no callback domains associated with this malware since connections are inbound only on a specified port number.

    Proxy Tool: Implants in this malware family are typically loaded via a dropper installed as a service, then configured to listen on TCP port 443. The implant may have an associated configuration file which can contain a configurable port. This proxy tool has basic backdoor functionality, including the ability to fingerprint the victim machine, run remote commands, perform directory listings, perform process listings, and transfer files.

    Destructive Hard Drive Tool: This tool is a tailored hard-drive wiping tool that is intended to destroy data past the point of recovery and to complicate the victim machine’s recovery. If the CNE operator has administrator-level privileges on the host, the program will over-write portions of up-to the first four physical drives attached, and over-write the master boot record (MBR) with a program designed to cause further damage if the hard drive is re-booted. This further results in the victim machine being non-operational with irrecoverable data (There is a caveat for machines installed with the windows 7 operating system: windows 7 machines will continue to operate in a degraded state with the targeted files destroyed until after reboot, in which the infected MBR then wipes the drive.) If the actor has user-level access, the result includes specific files being deleted and practically irrecoverable, but the victim machine would remain usable.

    Destructive Target Cleaning Tool: This tool renders victim machines inoperable by overwriting the Master Boot Record. The tool is dropped and installed by another executable and consists of three parts: an executable and a dll which contain the destructive components, and an encoded command file that contains the actual destruction commands to be executed.

    Network Propagation Wiper: The malware has the ability to propagate throughout the target network via built-in Windows shares. Based on the username/password provided in the configuration file and the hostname/IP address of target systems, the malware will access remote network shares in order to upload a copy of the wiper and begin the wiping process on these remote systems. The malware uses several methods to access shares on the remote systems to begin wiping files. Checking for existing shares via “\\hostname\admin$\system32” and “\\hostname\shared$\system32” or create a new share “cmd.exe /q /c net share shared$=%SystemRoot% /GRANT:everyone, FULL”. Once successful, the malware uploads a copy of the wiper file “taskhostXX.exe”, changes the file-time to match that of the built-in file “calc.exe”, and starts the remote process. The remote process is started via the command “cmd.exe /c wmic.exe /node:hostname /user:username /password:pass PROCESS CALL CREATE”. Hostname, username, and password are then obtained from the configuration file. Afterwards, the remote network share is removed via “cmd.exe /q /c net share shared$ /delete”. Once the wiper has been uploaded, the malware reports its status back to one of the four C2 IP addresses.

    Technical and strategic mitigation recommendations are included in the Solution section below.

    US-CERT recommends reviewing the Security Tip Handling Destructive Malware #ST13-003.

    Description

    Cyber threat actors are using an SMB worm to conduct cyber exploitation activities.  This tool contains five components – a listening implant, lightweight backdoor, proxy tool, destructive hard drive tool, and destructive target cleaning tool.

    The SMB worm propagates throughout an infected network via brute-force authentication attacks, and connects to a C2 infrastructure.

    Impact

    Due to the highly destructive functionality of this malware, an organization infected could experience operational impacts including loss of intellectual property and disruption of critical systems.

    Solution

    Users and administrators are recommended to take the following preventive measures to protect their computer networks:

    • Use and maintain anti-virus software – Anti-virus software recognizes and protects your computer against most known viruses. It is important to keep your anti-virus software up-to-date (see Understanding Anti-Virus Software for more information).
    • Keep your operating system and application software up-to-date – Install software patches so that attackers can't take advantage of known problems or vulnerabilities. Many operating systems offer automatic updates. If this option is available, you should enable it (see Understanding Patches for more information).
    • Review Security Tip Handling Destructive Malware #ST13-003 and evaluate their capabilities encompassing planning, preparation, detection, and response for such an event.
    • Review Recommended Practices for Control Systems, and Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies (pdf).

    The following is a list of the Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) that can be added to network security solutions to determine whether they are present on a network.

    MD5s:

    SMB worm tool:

    MD5: f6f48551d7723d87daeef2e840ae008f

    Characterization: File Hash Watchlist

    Notes: "SMB worm tool"

             Earliest PE compile Time: 20141001T072107Z

             Most Recent PE compile Time: 20141001T072107Z

     

    MD5: 194ae075bf53aa4c83e175d4fa1b9d89

    Characterization: File Hash Watchlist

    Notes: "SMB worm tool"

             Earliest PE compile Time: 20141001T120954Z

             Most Recent PE compile Time: 20141001T142138Z

     

    Lightweight backdoor:

    MD5: f57e6156907dc0f6f4c9e2c5a792df48

    Characterization: File Hash Watchlist

    Notes: "Lightweight backdoor"

             Earliest PE compile time: 20110411T225224Z

             Latest PE compile time: 20110411T225224Z

     

    MD5: 838e57492f632da79dcd5aa47b23f8a9

    Characterization: File Hash Watchlist

    Notes: "Lightweight backdoor"

             Earliest PE compile time: 20110517T050015Z

             Latest PE compile time: 20110605T204508Z

     

    MD5: 11c9374cea03c3b2ca190b9a0fd2816b

    Characterization: File Hash Watchlist

    Notes: "Lightweight backdoor"

             Earliest PE compile time: 20110729T062417Z

             Latest PE compile time: 20110729T062958Z

     

    MD5: 7fb0441a08690d4530d2275d4d7eb351

    Characterization: File Hash Watchlist

    Notes: "Lightweight backdoor"

             Earliest PE compile time: 20120128T071327Z

             Latest PE compile time: 20120128T071327Z

     

    MD5: 7759c7d2c6d49c8b0591a3a7270a44da

    Characterization: File Hash Watchlist

    Notes: "Lightweight backdoor"

             Earliest PE compile time: 20120309T105837Z

             Latest PE compile time: 20120309T105837Z

     

    MD5: 7e48d5ba6e6314c46550ad226f2b3c67

    Characterization: File Hash Watchlist

    Notes: "Lightweight backdoor"

             Earliest PE compile time: 20120311T090329Z

             Latest PE compile time: 20120311T090329Z

     

    MD5: 0a87c6f29f34a09acecce7f516cc7fdb

    Characterization: File Hash Watchlist

    Notes: "Lightweight backdoor"

             Earliest PE compile time: 20120325T053138Z

             Latest PE compile time: 20130513T090422Z

     

    MD5: 25fb1e131f282fa25a4b0dec6007a0ce

    Characterization: File Hash Watchlist

    Notes: "Lightweight backdoor"

             Earliest PE compile time: 20130802T054822Z

             Latest PE compile time: 20130802T054822Z

     

    MD5: 9761dd113e7e6673b94ab4b3ad552086

    Characterization: File Hash Watchlist

    Notes: "Lightweight backdoor"

             Earliest PE compile time: 20130913T013016Z

             Latest PE compile time: 20130913T013016Z

     

    MD5: c905a30badb458655009799b1274205c

    Characterization: File Hash Watchlist

    Notes: "Lightweight backdoor"

             Earliest PE compile time: 20140205T090906Z

             Latest PE compile time: 20140205T090906Z

     

    MD5: 40adcd738c5bdc5e1cc3ab9a48b3df39

    Characterization: File Hash Watchlist

    Notes: "Lightweight backdoor"

             Earliest PE compile time: 20140320T152637Z

             Latest PE compile time: 20140402T023748Z

     

    MD5: 68a26b8eaf2011f16a58e4554ea576a1

    Characterization: File Hash Watchlist

    Notes: "Lightweight backdoor"

             Earliest PE compile time: 20140321T014949Z

             Latest PE compile time: 20140321T014949Z

     

    MD5: 74982cd1f3be3d0acfb0e6df22dbcd67

    Characterization: File Hash Watchlist

    Notes: "Lightweight backdoor"

             Earliest PE compile time: 20140506T020330Z

             Latest PE compile time: 20140506T020330Z

     

    Proxy tool:

    MD5: 734740b16053ccc555686814a93dfbeb

    Characterization: File Hash Watchlist

    Notes: "Proxy tool"

             Earliest PE compile time: 20140611T064905Z

             Latest PE compile time: 20140611T064905Z

     

    MD5: 3b9da603992d8001c1322474aac25f87

    Characterization: File Hash Watchlist

    Notes: "Proxy tool"

             Earliest PE compile time: 20140617T035143Z

             Latest PE compile time: 20140617T035143Z

     

    MD5: e509881b34a86a4e2b24449cf386af6a

    Characterization: File Hash Watchlist

    Notes: "Proxy tool"

             Earliest PE compile time : 20140618T064527Z

             Latest PE compile time: 20140618T064527Z

     

    MD5: 9ab7f2bf638c9d911c2c742a574db89e

    Characterization: File Hash Watchlist

    Notes: "Proxy tool"

             Earliest PE compile time: 20140724T011233Z

             Latest PE compile time: 20140724T011233Z

     

    MD5: a565e8c853b8325ad98f1fac9c40fb88

    Characterization: File Hash Watchlist

    Notes: "Proxy tool"

             Earliest PE compile time: 20140724T065031Z

             Latest PE compile time: 20140902T135050Z

     

    MD5: 0bb82def661dd013a1866f779b455cf3

    Characterization: File Hash Watchlist

    Notes: "Proxy tool"

             Earliest PE compile time: 20140819T024812Z

             Latest PE compile time: 20140819T024812Z

     

    MD5: b8ffff8b57586d24e1e65cd0b0ad9173

    Characterization: File Hash Watchlist

    Notes: "Proxy tool"

             Earliest PE compile time: 20140902T172442Z

             Latest PE compile time: 20140902T172442Z

     

    MD5: 4ef0ad7ad4fe3ef4fb3db02cd82bface

    Characterization: File Hash Watchlist

    Notes: "Proxy tool"

             Earliest PE compile time: 20141024T134136Z

             Latest PE compile time: 20141024T134136Z

     

    MD5: eb435e86604abced7c4a2b11c4637a52

    Characterization: File Hash Watchlist

    Notes: "Proxy tool"

             Earliest PE compile time: 20140526T010925Z

             Latest PE compile time: 20140526T010925Z

     

    MD5: ed7a9c6d9fc664afe2de2dd165a9338c

    Characterization: File Hash Watchlist

    Notes: "Proxy tool"

             Earliest PE compile time: 20140611T064904Z

     

    Destructive hard drive tool:

    MD5: 8dec36d7f5e6cbd5e06775771351c54e

    Characterization: File Hash Watchlist

    Notes: "Destructive hard drive tool"

             Earliest PE compile time: 20120507T151820Z

             Latest PE compile time: 20120507T151820Z

     

    MD5: a385900a36cad1c6a2022f31e8aca9f7

    Characterization: File Hash Watchlist

    Notes: "Destructive target cleaning tool"

             Earliest PE compile time: 20130318T003315Z

             Latest PE compile time: 20130318T003315Z

     

    MD5: 7bea4323807f7e8cf53776e24cbd71f1

    Characterization: File Hash Watchlist

    Notes: "Destructive target cleaning tool"

             Earliest PE compile time: 20130318T003319Z

             Latest PE compile time: 20130318T003319Z

     

    Name: d1c27ee7ce18675974edf42d4eea25c6.bin

    Size: 268579 bytes (268.6 KB)

    MD5: D1C27EE7CE18675974EDF42D4EEA25C6

    PE Compile Time: 2014-11-22 00:06:54

     

    The malware has the following characteristics:

    While the original filename of this file is unknown, it was likely “diskpartmg16.exe”. This file serves as a dropper. It drops destructive malware: “igfxtrayex.exe”. When the dropper file was executed, it started a second instance of itself with “-i” as an argument, and then terminated. The second instance of the dropper file installed itself as the “WinsSchMgmt” service with “-k” as a command line argument, started the service, and then terminated. The “WinsSchMgmt” service executed the file with “-k” as an argument, which started another instance of the file using “-s” as an argument. The “-s” instance dropped and executed “igfxtrayex.exe”, created “net_ver.dat”, and began generating network traffic over TCP ports 445 and 139 to victim IP addresses.

     

    Name: net_ver.dat

    Size: 4572 bytes (4.6 KB)  (size will vary)

    MD5: 93BC819011B2B3DA8487F964F29EB934  (hash will vary)

     

    This is a log file created by the dropper, and appended to as the scans progress  It contains what appear to be hostnames, IP addresses, and the number 2.   Entries in the file have the structure “HOSTNAME | IP Address | 2”.

     

    Name: igfxtrayex.exe

    Size: 249856 bytes (249.9 KB)

    MD5: 760C35A80D758F032D02CF4DB12D3E55

    PE Compile Time: 2014-11-24 04:11:08

     

    This file is destructive malware: a disk wiper with network beacon capabilities. If “igfxtrayex.exe” is run with no parameters, it creates and starts a copy of itself with the “–i” argument. After 10 minutes, the “igfxtrayex.exe” makes three copies of itself and places them in the same directory from which it was executed. These copies are named according to the format “taskhostXX.exe” (where X is a randomly generated ASCII character). These copies are then executed, each with a different argument (one being “-m”, one being “-d” and the other “-w”). Network connection attempts are made to one of three hard-coded IP addresses in a random order to port 8080 or 8000. If a connection to the IP address cannot be made, it attempts to connect to another of the three IP addresses, until connections to all three IP addresses have been attempted. The following command-line string is then executed: “cmd.exe /c net stop MSExchangeIS /y”. A 120-minute (2 hour) sleep command is issued after which the computer is shut down and rebooted.

     

    Name: iissvr.exe

    Size: 114688 bytes (114.7 KB)

    MD5: E1864A55D5CCB76AF4BF7A0AE16279BA

    PE Compile Time: 2014-11-13 02:05:35

     

    This file, when executed, starts a listener on localhost port 80. It has 3 files contained in the resource section; all xor’d with 0x63.

     

    Name: usbdrv3_32bit.sys

    Size: 24280 bytes (24.3 KB)

    MD5: 6AEAC618E29980B69721158044C2E544

    PE Compile Time: 2009-08-21 06:05:32

     

    This SYS file is a commercially available tool that allows read/write access to files and raw disk sectors for user mode applications in Windows 2000, XP, 2003, Vista, 2008 (32-bit). It is dropped from resource ID 0x81 of “igfxtrayex.exe”.

     

    Name: usbdrv3_64bit.sys

    Size: 28120 bytes (28.1 KB)

    MD5: 86E212B7FC20FC406C692400294073FF

    PE Compile Time: 2009-08-21 06:05:35

     

    This SYS file is a also a commercially available tool that allows read/write access to files and raw disk sectors for user mode applications in Windows 2000, XP, 2003, Vista, 2008 (64-bit). It is dropped from resource ID 0x83 of “igfxtrayex.exe”.

     

    Name: igfxtpers.exe

    Size: 91888 bytes (91.9 KB)

    MD5: e904bf93403c0fb08b9683a9e858c73e

    PE Compile Time: 2014-07-07 08:01:09

     

    A summary of the C2 IP addresses:

    IP AddressCountryPortFilename
    203.131.222.102Thailand8080Diskpartmg16.exe
    igfxtrayex.exe
    igfxtpers.exe
    217.96.33.164Poland8000Diskpartmg16.exe
    igfxtrayex.exe
    88.53.215.64Italy8000Diskpartmg16.exe
    igfxtrayex.exe
    200.87.126.116Bolivia8000--
    58.185.154.99Singapore8080--
    212.31.102.100Cypress8080--
    208.105.226.235United States--igfxtpers.exe

     

    Snort signatures:

    SMB Worm Tool (not necessarily the tool itself):

    alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Wiper 2"; sid:42000002; rev:1; flow:established; content:"|c9 06 d9 96 fc 37 23 5a fe f9 40 ba 4c 94 14 98|"; depth:16; classtype:bad-unknown;)

    alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Wiper 3"; sid:42000003; rev:1; flow:established; content:"|aa 64 ba f2 56|"; depth:50; classtype:bad-unknown;)

    alert ip any any -> any any (msg:"Wiper 4"; sid:42000004; rev:1; content:"|aa 74 ba f2 b9 75|"; depth:74; classtype:bad-unknown;)

    alert tcp any any -> any [8000,8080] (msg:"Wiper 5"; sid:42000005; rev:1; flow:established,to_server; dsize:42; byte_test:2,=,40,0,little; content:"|04 00 00 00|"; depth:4; offset:38; classtype:bad-unknown;)

     

    Listening Implant:

    alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Listening Implant 1"; sid:42000006; rev:1; flow:established; content:"|0c 1f 1f 1f 4d 5a 4c 4f 50 51 4c 5a 3f 2d 2f 2f 3f 50 54 3e 3e 3e|"; depth:22; classtype:bad-unknown;)

    alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Listening Implant 2"; sid:42000007; rev:1; flow:established; content:"|d3 c4 d2 d1 ce cf d2 c4 a1 b3 b1 b1 a1 ce ca a0 a0 a0|"; depth:18; classtype:bad-unknown;)

    alert ip any any -> any any (msg:"Listening Implant 3"; sid:42000008; rev:1; content:"|17 08 14 13 67 0f 13 13 17 67 15 02 16 12 02 14 13 78 47 47|"; depth:24; classtype:bad-unknown;)

    alert ip any any -> any any (msg:"Listening Implant 4"; sid:42000009; rev:1; content:"|4f 50 4c 4b 3f 57 4b 4b 4f 3f 4d 5a 4e 4a 5a 4c 4b 20 1f|"; depth:23; classtype:bad-unknown;)

    alert ip any any -> any any (msg:"Listening Implant 5"; sid:42000010; rev:1; content:"|15 02 14 17 08 09 14 02 67 75 77 77 67 08 0c 66 66 66|"; depth:22; classtype:bad-unknown;)

    alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Listening Implant 6"; sid:42000011; rev:1; flow:established; content:"|09 22 33 30 28 35 2c|"; fast_pattern:only; classtype:bad-unknown;)

    alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Listening Implant 7"; sid:42000012; rev:1; flow:established; content:"|13 2f 22 35 22 67 26 35 22 29 27 33 67 28 37 22 29 67 37 28 35 33 34 69|"; fast_pattern:only; classtype:bad-unknown;)

    alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Listening Implant 8"; sid:42000013; rev:1; flow:established; content:"|43 47 47 47 45 67 47 47 43 47 47 47 44 67 47 47|"; classtype:bad-unknown;)

    alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Listening Implant 9"; sid:42000014; rev:1; flow:established; content:"|43 47 47 47 42 67 47 47 43 47 47 47 4f 67 47 47 43 47 47 47 43 67 47 47 43 47 47 47 4e 67 47 47|"; classtype:bad-unknown;)

    alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Listening Implant 10"; sid:42000015; rev:1; flow:established; content:"|d1 ce d2 d5 a1 c9 d5 d5 d1 a1 d3 c4 d0 d4 c4 d2 d5 be|"; depth:18; classtype:bad-unknown;)

    alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Listening Implant 11"; sid:42000016; rev:1; flow:established; content:"|17 08 14 13 67 0f 13 13 17 67 15 02 16 12 02 14 13 78|"; depth:18; classtype:bad-unknown;)

    alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Listening Implant 12"; sid:42000017; rev:1; flow:established; content:"|0c 1f 1f 1f 4f 50 4c 4b 3f 57 4b 4b 4f 3f 4d 5a 4e 4a 5a 4c 4b 20|"; classtype:bad-unknown;)

     

    Lightweight Backdoor:

    alert tcp any 488 -> any any (msg:"Lightweight Backdoor 1"; sid:42000018; rev:1; flow:established,from_server; content:"|60 db 37 37 37 37 37 37|"; fast_pattern:only; classtype:bad-unknown;)

    alert tcp any any -> any 488 (msg:"Lightweight Backdoor 2"; sid:42000019; rev:1; flow:established,to_server; content:"|60 db 37 37 37 37 37 37|"; fast_pattern:only; classtype:bad-unknown;)

    alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Lightweight Backdoor 3"; sid:42000020; rev:1; flow:established; content:"|4c 4c|"; depth:2; offset:16; content:"|75 14 2a 2a|"; distance:4; within:4; classtype:bad-unknown;)

    alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Lightweight Backdoor 4"; sid:42000021; rev:1; flow:established; content:"|8a 10 80 c2 67 80 f2 24 88 10|"; fast_pattern:only; content:"|8a 10 80 f2 24 80 ea 67 88 10|"; classtype:bad-unknown;)

    alert tcp any 488 -> any any (msg:"Lightweight Backdoor 5"; sid:42000022; rev:1; flow:established,from_server; content:"|65 db 37 37 37 37 37 37|"; fast_pattern:only; classtype:bad-unknown;)

    alert tcp any any -> any 488 (msg:"Lightweight Backdoor 6"; sid:42000023; rev:1; flow:established,to_server; content:"|65 db 37 37 37 37 37 37|"; fast_pattern:only; classtype:bad-unknown;)

    alert tcp any [547,8080,133,117,189,159] -> any any (msg:"Lightweight Backdoor 7"; sid:42000024; rev:1; flow:established,from_server; content:"|7b 08 2a 2a|"; offset:17; content:"|08 2a 2a 01 00|"; distance:0; classtype:bad-unknown;)

    alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Lightweight Backdoor 8"; sid:42000025; rev:1; flow:established; content:"|8a 10 80 ea 62 80 f2 b4 88 10|"; fast_pattern:only; content:"|8a 10 80 f2 b4 80 c2 62 88 10|"; classtype:bad-unknown;)

    alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Lightweight Backdoor 9"; sid:42000026; rev:1; flow:established; content:"|8a 10 80 c2 4e 80 f2 79 88 10|"; fast_pattern:only; content:"|8a 10 80 f2 79 80 ea 4e 88 10|"; classtype:bad-unknown;)

    alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Lightweight Backdoor 10"; sid:42000027; rev:1; flow:established; content:"Sleepy!@#qaz13402scvsde890"; fast_pattern:only; content:"BC435@PRO62384923412!@3!"; nocase; classtype:bad-unknown;)

     

    Proxy Tool:

    alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Proxy Tool 1"; sid:42000028; rev:1; flow:established; content:"|8a 10 80 c2 3a 80 f2 73 88 10|"; fast_pattern:only; content:"|8a 10 80 f2 73 80 ea 3a 88 10|"; classtype:bad-unknown;)

    alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Proxy Tool 2"; sid:42000029; rev:1; flow:established; content:!"HTTP/1"; content:"|e2 1d 49 49|"; depth:4; fast_pattern; content:"|49 49 49 49|"; distance:4; within:4; classtype:bad-unknown;)

    alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Proxy Tool 3"; sid:42000030; rev:1; flow:established; content:"|82 f4 de d4 d3 c2 ca f5 c8 c8 d3 82 fb f4 de d4 d3 c2 ca 94 95 fb d4 d1 c4 cf c8 d4 d3 89 c2 df c2 87 8a cc 87 00|"; fast_pattern:only; classtype:bad-unknown;)

     

    Malware associated with the cyber threat actor:

    alert tcp any any -> any [8000,8080] (msg:"WIPER4";flow: established, to_server;dsize:42;content:"|28 00|";depth:2;content:"|04 00 00 00|";offset:38;depth:4;sid:123;)

     

    Host Based Indicators

    Below are potential YARA signatures to detect malware binaries on host machines:

     

    SMB Worm Tool:

    strings:

    $STR1 = "Global\\FwtSqmSession106829323_S-1-5-19"

    $STR2 ="EVERYONE"

    $STR3 = "y0uar3@s!llyid!07,ou74n60u7f001"

    $STR4 = "\\KB25468.dat" condition:

    (uintl6(0) == 0x5A4D or uint16(0) == 0xCFD0 or uint16(0) ==0xC3D4 or uint32(0) == 0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and all of them

     

    Lightweight Backdoor:

    strings:

    $STR1 = ''NetMgStart"

    $STR2 = ''Netmgmt.srg"

    condition:

    (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and all of them

     

    Lightweight Backdoor:

    strings:

    $STR1 = "prxTroy" ascii wide nocase

    condition:

    (uintl6(0) == 0x5A4D or uint16(0) == 0xCFD0 or uintl6(0) == 0xC3D4 or uint32(0) == 0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and all of them

     

    Lightweight Backdoor:

    strings:

    $strl  = { C6 45 E8 64 C6 45 E9 61 C6 45 EA 79 C6 45 EB 69 C6 45 EC 70 C6 45 ED 6D C6 45 EE 72 C6 45 EF 2E C6 45 F0 74 C6 45 F1  62 C6 45 F2 6C } // 'dayipmr.tbl' being moved to ebp

    condition:

    (uintl6(0) == 0x5A4D or uintl6(0) == 0xCFD0 or uint16(0) == 0xC3D4 or

    uint32(0) == 0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and all of them

     

    Lightweight Backdoor:

    strings:

    $strl  = { C6 45 F4 61 C6 45 F5 6E C6 45 F6 73 C6 45 F7 69 C6 45 F8 2E C6 45 F9 6E C6 45 FA 6C C6 45 FB 73 } // 'ansi.nls' being moved to ebp

    condition:

    (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D or uint16(0) == 0xCFD0 or uintl6(0) == 0xC3D4 or

    uint32(0) == 0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and all of them

     

    Lightweight Backdoor:

    strings:

    $strl  = { C6 45 F4 74 C6 45 F5 6C C6 45 F6 76 C6 45 F7 63 C6 45 F8 2E C6 45 F9 6E C6 45 FA 6C C6 45 FB 73 } // 'tlvc.nls' being moved to ebp

    condition:

    (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D or uint16(0) == 0xCFD0 or uint16(0) == 0xC3D4 or uint32(0) == 0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and all of them

     

    Lightweight Backdoor:

    strings:

    $STR1 = { 8A 10 80 ?? 4E 80 ?? 79 88 10}

    $STR2 = {SA 10 80?? 79 80 ?? 4E 88 10}

    condition:

    (uintl6(0) == 0x5A4D or uintl6(0) == 0xCFD0 or uint16(0) == 0xC3D4 or uint32(0) == 0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and all of them

     

    Proxy Tool:

    strings:

    $STR1 = "pmsconfig.msi" wide

    $STR2 = "pmslog.msi" wide

    condition:

    (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D or uint16(0) == 0xCFD0 or uintl6(0) == 0xC3D4 or uint32(0) == 0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and any of them

     

    Proxy Tool:

    strings:

    $STR1 = { 82 F4 DE D4 D3 C2 CA F5 C8 C8 D3 82 FB F4 DE D4 D3 C2 CA 94 95 FB D4 Dl  C4 CF C8 D4 D3 89 C2 DF C2 87 8A CC 87 00 } // '%SystemRoot%\System32\svchost.exe -k' xor A7

    condition:

    (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D or uintl6(0) == 0xCFD0 or uint16(0) == 0xC3D4 or

    uint32(0) == 0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and all of them

     

    Proxy Tool:

    strings:

    $STR2 = {8A 04 17 8B FB 34 A7 46 88 02 83 C9 FF}

    condition:

    (uintl6(0) == 0x5A4D or uint16(0) == 0xCFD0 or uintl6(0) == 0xC3D4 or uint32(0) == 0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and $STR2

     

    Destructive Hard Drive Tool:

    strings:

    $str0= "MZ"

    $str1 = {c6 84 24 ?? ( 00 | 01 ) 00 00 }

    $xorInLoop = { 83 EC 20 B9 08 00 00 00 33 D2 56 8B 74 24 30 57 8D 7C 24 08

    F3 A5 8B 7C 24 30 85 FF 7E 3A 8B 74 24 2C 8A 44 24 08 53 8A 4C 24 21 8A 5C 24 2B 32 C1 8A 0C 32 32 C3 32 C8 88 0C 32 B9 1E 00 00 00 8A 5C 0C 0C 88 5C 0C 0D 49 83 F9 FF 7F F2 42 88 44 24 0C 3B D7 7C D0 5B 5F 5E 83 C4 20 C3 }

    condition:

    $str0 at 0 and $xorInLoop and #str1 > 300

     

    Destructive Target Cleaning Tool:

    strings:

    $s1  = {d3000000 [4] 2c000000 [12] 95000000 [4] 6a000000 [8] 07000000}

    condition:

    (uintl6(0) == 0x5A4D and uintl6(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them

     

    Destructive Target Cleaning Tool:

    strings:

    $secureWipe= { 83 EC 34 53 55 8B 6C 24 40 56 57 83 CE FF 55 C7 44 24 2C D3 00 00 00 C7 44 24 30 2C 00 00 00 89 74 24 34 89 74 24 38 C7 44 24 3C 95 00 00 00 C7 44 24 40 6A 00 00 00 89 74 24 44 C7 44 24 14 07 00 00 00 FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 3B C6 89 44 24 1C 0F 84 (D8 | d9) 01 00 00 33 FF 68 00 00 01 00 57 FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B D8 3B DF 89 5C 24 14 0F 84 (BC | BD) 01 00 00 8B 44 24 1C A8 01 74 0A 24 FE 50 55 FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B 44 24 4C 2B C7 74 20 48 74 0F 83 E8 02 75 1C C7 44 24 10 03 00 00 00 EB 12 C7 44 24 10 01 00 00 00 89 74 24 28 EB 04 89 7C 24 10 8B 44 24 10 89 7C 24 1C 3B C7 0F 8E ( 5C | 5d ) 01 00 00 8D 44 24 28 89 44 24 4C EB 03 83 CE FF 8B 4C 24 4C 8B 01 3B C6 74 17 8A D0 B9 00 40 00 00 8A F2 8B FB 8B C2 C1 E0 10 66 8B C2 F3 AB EB ( 13 | 14) 33 F6 (E8 | ff 15) ?? ?? ?? ?? 88 04 1E 46 81 FE 00 00 01 00 7C ( EF | ee) 6A 00 6A 00 6A 03 6A 00 6A 03 68 00 00 00 C0 55 FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B F0 83 FE FF 0F 84 FA 00 00 00 8D 44 24 20 50 56 FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B 2D ?? ?? ?? ?? 6A 02 6A 00 6A FF 56 FF D5 8D 4C 24 18 6A 00 51 6A 01 53 56 FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 56 FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 6A 00 6A 00 6A 00 56 FF D5 8B 44 24 24 8B 54 24 20 33 FF 33 DB 85 CO 7C 5A 7F 0A 85 D2 76 54 EB 04 8B 54 24 20 8B CA BD 00 00 01 00 2B CF 1B C3 85 C0 7F 0A 7C 04 3B CD 73 04 2B D7 8B EA 8B 44 24 14 8D 54 24 18 6A 00 52 55 50 56 FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B 6C 24 18 8B 44 24 24 03 FD 83 D3 00 3B D8 7C BE 7F 08 8B 54 24 20 3B FA 72 B8 8B 2D ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B 5C 24 10 8B 7C 24 1C 8D 4B FF 3B F9 75 17 56 FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 6A 00 6A 00 6A 00 56 FF D5 56 FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 56 FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 56 FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B 4C 24 4C 8B 6C 24 48 47 83 C1 04 3B FB 8B 5C 24 14 89 7C 24 1C 89 4C 24 4C 0F 8C ( AE | AD) FE FF FF 6A 00 55 E8 ?? ?? ?? ?? 83 C4 08 53 FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 5F 5E 5D 5B 83 C4 34 C3}

    condition:

    $secureWipe

     

    Destructive Target Cleaning Tool:

    strings:

    $S1_CMD_Arg = ""/install'"' fullword

    $S2_CMD_Parse= ""\""%s'"'  /install \""%s\""'"' fullword

    $S3_CMD_Builder= ""\'"'%s\""  \""%s\'"' \""%s\'"' %s'"' fullword

    condition:

    all of them

     

    Destructive Target Cleaning Tool:

    strings:

    $BATCH_SCRIPT_LN1_0 = ""goto x"" fullword

    $BATCH_SCRIPT_LN1_1 = '"'del"" fullword

    $BATCH_SCRIPT_LN2_0 = ""if exist"" fullword

    $BATCH_SCRIPT_LN3_0 = "":x'"' fullword

    $BATCH_SCRIPT_LN4_0 = ""zz%d.bat"'' fullword

    condition:

    (#BATCH_SCRIPT_LNl_l == 2) and all of them"

     

    Destructive Target Cleaning Tool:

    strings:

    $MCU_DLL_ZLIB_COMPRESSED2=

    {5CECABAE813CC9BCD5A542F454910428343479806F71D5521E2AOD}

    condition:

    $MCU_DLL_ZLIB_COMPRESSED2"

     

    Destructive Target Cleaning Tool:

    strings:

    $MCU_INF_StartHexDec =

    {010346080A30D63633000B6263750A5052322A00103D1B570A30E67F2A00130952690A50 3A0D2A000E00A26El5104556766572636C7669642E657865}

    $MCU_INF_StartHexEnc =

    {6C3272386958BF075230780A0A54676166024968790C7A6779588F5E47312739310163615B3D59686721CF5F2120263ElF5413531FlE004543544C55}

    condition:

    $MCU_INF_StartHexEnc or

    $MCU_INF_StartHexDec

    Destructive Target Cleaning Tool:

    strings:

    $ = "SetFilePointer"

    $ = "SetEndOfFile"

    $ = {75 17 56 ff 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 6a 00 6a 00 6a 00 56 ffD5 56 ff 15?? ?? ??

    ?? 56}

    condition:

    (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them

     

    Destructive Target Cleaning Tool:

    strings:

    $license=

    {E903FFFF820050006F007200740069006F006E007300200063006F007000790072006900670068007400200052006F006200650072007400200064006500200042006100740068002C0020004A006F007200690073002000760061006E002000520061006E007400770069006A006B002C002000440065006C00690061006E000000000000000250000000000A002200CE000800EA03FFFF8200}

    $PuTTY= {50007500540054005900}

    condition:

    (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uintl6(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and $license and not $PuTTY

     

    Malware used by cyber threat actor:

    strings:

    $heapCreateFunction_0 = {33C06A003944240868001000000F94C050FF15????????85C0A3???????07436E893FEFFFF83F803A3???????0750D68F8030000E8??00000059EB0A83F8027518E8????000085C0750FFF35???????0FF15???????033C0C36A0158C3}

    $heapCreateFunction =

    {558BECB82C120000E8????FFFF8D8568FFFFFF5350C78568FFFFFF94000000FF1????????085C0741A83BD78FFFFFF02751183BD6CFFFFFF0572086A0158E9020100008D85D4EDFFF68901000005068???????0FF15???????085C00F84D000000033DB8D8DD4EDFFFF389DD4EDFFFF74138A013C617C083C7A7F042C20880141381975ED8D85D4EDFFFF6A165068???????0E8????000083C40C85C075088D85D4EDFFFFEB498D8564FEFFFF68040100005053FF15???????0389D64FEFFFF8D8D64FEFFFF74138A013C617C083C7A7F042C20880141381975ED8D8564FEFFFF508D85D4EDFFFF50E8????????59593BC3743E6A2C50E8????????593BC3597430408BC83818740E80393B75048819EB0141381975F26A0A5350E8????000083C40C83F802741D83F803741883F80174138D45FC50E898FEFFFF807DFC06591BC083C0035BC9C3}

    $getMajorMinorLinker =

    {568B7424086A00832600FF15???????06681384D5A75148B483C85C9740D03C18A481A880E8A401B8846015EC3}

    $openServiceManager =

    {FF15???0?0?08B?885??74????????????????5?FF15???0?0?08B?????0?0?08BF?85F?74}

    condition:

    all of them

     

    Malware used by cyber threat actor:

    strings:

    $str1 = "_quit"

    $str2 = "_exe"

    $str3 = "_put"

    $str4 = "_got"

    $str5 = "_get"

    $str6 ="_del"

    $str7 = "_dir"

    $str8 = { C7 44 24 18 1F F7}

    condition:

    (uintl6(0) == 0x5A4D or uintl6(0) == 0xCFD0  or uintl6(0) == 0xC3D4 or uint32(0) == 0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and all of them

     

    Malware used by cyber threat actor:

    strings:

    $STR1 = { 50 68 80 00 00 00 68 FF FF 00 00 51 C7 44 24 1C 3a 8b 00 00 }

    condition:

    (uintl6(0) == 0x5A4D or uint16(0) == 0xCFD0 or uintl6(0) == 0xC3D4 or uint32(0) == 0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and all of them

     

    Recommended Security Practices

    Because of the highly destructive functionality of the malware, an organization infected with the malware could experience operational impacts including loss of intellectual property (IP) and disruption of critical systems. Actual impact to organizations may vary depending on the type and number of systems impacted.

    Tactical Mitigations

    • Implement the indicators of compromise within your systems for detection and mitigation purposes.
    • Encourage users to transfer critical files to network shares, to allow for central backed up.
    • Execute daily backups of all critical systems.
    • Periodically execute an “offline” backup of critical files to removable media.
    • Establish emergency communications plans should network resources become unavailable.
    • Isolate any critical networks (including operations networks) from business systems.
    • Identify critical systems and evaluate the need for having on-hand spares to quickly restore service.
    • Ensure antivirus is up to date.
    • Disable credential caching for all desktop devices with particular importance on critical systems such as servers and restrict the number of cached credential for all portable devices to no more than three if possible. This can be accomplished through a Group Policy Object (GPO).
    • Disable AutoRun and Autoplay for any removable media device.
    • Prevent or limit the use of all removable media devices on systems to limit the spread or introduction of malicious software and possible exfiltration data, except where there is a valid business case for use. This business case must be approved by the organization Chief IT Security Officer, with policy/guidance on how such media should be used.
    • Consider restricting account privileges. It is our recommendation that all daily operations should be executed using standard user accounts unless administrative privileges are required for that specific function. Configure all standard user accounts to prevent the execution and installation of any unknown or unauthorized software. Both standard and administrative accounts should have access only to services required for nominal daily duties, enforcing the concept of separation of duties. Lastly, disable Web and email capabilities on administrative accounts. Compromise of admin accounts is one vector that allows malicious activity to become truly persistent in a network environment.
    • Ensure that password policy rules are enforced and Admin password values are changed periodically.
    • Consider prohibiting hosts within the production environment or DMZ from sharing an Active Directory enterprise with hosts on other networks. Each environment should have separate forests within Active Directory, with no trust relationships allowed between the forests if at all possible. If necessary, the trust relationships should be one-way with the low integrity environment trusting the higher integrity environment.
    • Consider deployment of a coaching page with click through acceptance; these are traditionally deployed in an environment to log the acceptance of network acceptable use policy or to notify users of monitoring. Coaching pages also provide some measure of protection from automated malicious activity. This occurs because automated malware is normally incapable of physically clicking an acceptance radial button. Automated malware is traditionally hardcoded to execute, then retrieve commands or additional executables from the Internet. If the malware is unable to initiate an active connection, the full train of infection is potentially halted. The danger still exists that the physical user will authorize access, but through the use of coaching pages, infections can be limited or at least the rate of infection reduced.
    • Monitor logs -- Maintain and actively monitor a centralized logging solution that keeps track of all anomalous and potentially malicious activity.
    • Ensure that all network operating systems, web browsers, and other related network hardware and software remain updated with all current patches and fixes.

    Strategic Mitigations

    • Organizations should review Security Tip Handling Destructive Malware #ST13-003 and evaluate their capabilities encompassing planning, preparation, detection, and response for such an event.
    • Always keep your patch levels up to date, especially on computers that host public services accessible through the firewall, such as HTTP, FTP, mail, and DNS services.
    • Build host systems, especially critical systems such as servers, with only essential applications and components required to perform the intended function. Any unused applications or functions should be removed or disabled, if possible, to limit the attack surface of the host.
    • Implement network segmentation through V-LANs to limit the spread of malware.
    • Consider the deployment of Software Restriction Policy set to only allow the execution of approved software (application whitelisting)
    • Recommend the whitelisting of legitimate executable directories to prevent the execution of potentially malicious binaries.
    • Consider the use of two-factor authentication methods for accessing privileged root level accounts or systems.
    • Consider deploying a two-factor authentication through a hardened IPsec/VPN gateway with split-tunneling prohibited for secure remote access.
    • Deny direct Internet access, except through the use of proxies for Enterprise servers and workstations. Perform regular content filtering at the proxies or external firewall points of presence. Also consider the deployment of an explicit versus transparent proxy policy.
    • Implement a Secure Socket Layer (SSL) inspection capability to inspect both ingress and egress encrypted network traffic for potential malicious activity.
    • Isolate network services, such as email and Web application servers by utilizing a secure multi-tenant virtualization technology. This will limit the damage sustained from a compromise or attack of a single network component.
    • Implement best practice guidance and policy to restrict the use of non-Foundation assets for processing or accessing Foundation-controlled data or systems (e.g., working from home, or using a personal device while at the office). It is difficult to enforce corporate policies, detect intrusions, and conduct forensic analysis or remediate compromises on non-corporate owned devices.
    • Minimize network exposure for all control system devices. Control system devices should not directly face the Internet.
    • Place control system networks behind firewalls, and isolate or air gap them from the business network.
    • When remote access is required, use secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing that VPN is only as secure as the connected devices.
    • Industrial Control System (ICS)-CERT and US-CERT remind organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to taking defensive measures.

    References

    Revision History

    • December 19, 2014: Initial Release

    This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.


  • Nov 25, 2014 8:54:41 PM
    Original release date: November 25, 2014

    Systems Affected

    Microsoft Windows NT, 2000, XP, Vista, and 7

    Overview

    On November 24, 2014, Symantec released a report on Regin, a sophisticated backdoor Trojan used to conduct intelligence-gathering campaigns. At this time, the Regin campaign has not been identified targeting any organizations within the United States.

    Description

    Regin is a multi-staged, modular threat—meaning it has a number of components, each dependent on others to perform an attack. Each of the five stages is hidden and encrypted, with the exception of the first stage. The modular design poses difficulties to analysis, as all components must be available in order to fully understand the Trojan.  

    Impact

    Regin is a remote access Trojan (RAT), able to take control of input devices, capture credentials, monitor network traffic, and gather information on processes and memory utilization. The complex design provides flexibility to actors, as they can load custom features tailored to individual targets. [1]

    Solution

    Users and administrators are recommended to take the following preventive measures to protect their computer networks:

    • Use and maintain anti-virus software – Anti-virus software recognizes and protects your computer against most known viruses. It is important to keep your anti-virus software up-to-date (see Understanding Anti-Virus Software for more information). [2]
    • Keep your operating system and application software up-to-date – Install software patches so that attackers can't take advantage of known problems or vulnerabilities. Many operating systems offer automatic updates. If this option is available, you should enable it (see Understanding Patches for more information).

    The following is a list of the Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) that can be added to network security solutions to determine whether they are present on a network.

    MD5s: [1]

    Stage 1 files, 32 bit:

    06665b96e293b23acc80451abb413e50

    187044596bc1328efa0ed636d8aa4a5c

    1c024e599ac055312a4ab75b3950040a

    2c8b9d2885543d7ade3cae98225e263b

    4b6b86c7fec1c574706cecedf44abded

    6662c390b2bbbd291ec7987388fc75d7

    b269894f434657db2b15949641a67532

    b29ca4f22ae7b7b25f79c1d4a421139d

    b505d65721bb2453d5039a389113b566

    26297dc3cd0b688de3b846983c5385e5

    ba7bb65634ce1e30c1e5415be3d1db1d

    bfbe8c3ee78750c3a520480700e440f8

    d240f06e98c8d3e647cbf4d442d79475

    ffb0b9b5b610191051a7bdf0806e1e47

    Unusual stage 1 files apparently compiled from various public source codes merged with malicious code:

    01c2f321b6bfdb9473c079b0797567ba

    47d0e8f9d7a6429920329207a32ecc2e

    744c07e886497f7b68f6f7fe57b7ab54

    db405ad775ac887a337b02ea8b07fddc

    Stage 1, 64-bit system infection:

    bddf5afbea2d0eed77f2ad4e9a4f044d

    c053a0a3f1edcbbfc9b51bc640e808ce

    e63422e458afdfe111bd0b87c1e9772c

    Stage 2, 32 bit:

    18d4898d82fcb290dfed2a9f70d66833

    b9e4f9d32ce59e7c4daf6b237c330e25

    Stage 2, 64 bit:

    d446b1ed24dad48311f287f3c65aeb80

    Stage 3, 32 bit:

    8486ec3112e322f9f468bdea3005d7b5

    da03648948475b2d0e3e2345d7a9bbbb

    Stage 4, 32 bit:

    1e4076caa08e41a5befc52efd74819ea

    68297fde98e9c0c29cecc0ebf38bde95

    6cf5dc32e1f6959e7354e85101ec219a

    885dcd517faf9fac655b8da66315462d

    a1d727340158ec0af81a845abd3963c1

    Stage 4, 64 bit:

    de3547375fbf5f4cb4b14d53f413c503

    Note: Stages 2, 3, and 4 do not appear on infected systems as real files on disk. Hashes are provided for research purposes only.

    Registry branches used to store malware stages 2 and 3:

    \REGISTRY\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\RestoreList

    \REGISTRY\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Class\{39399744-44FC-AD65-474B-E4DDF-8C7FB97}

    \REGISTRY\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Class\{3F90B1B4-58E2-251E-6FFE-4D38C5631A04}

    \REGISTRY\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Class\{4F20E605-9452-4787-B793-D0204917CA58}

    \REGISTRY\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Class\{9B9A8ADB-8864-4BC4-8AD5-B17DFDBB9F58}

    IP IOCs [3]:

    61.67.114.73

    202.71.144.113

    203.199.89.80

    194.183.237.145

    References

    Revision History

    • November 25, 2014: Initial Release

    This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.


  • Nov 19, 2014 8:20:04 AM
    Original release date: November 19, 2014 | Last revised: November 25, 2014

    Systems Affected

    • Microsoft Windows Vista, 7, 8, and 8.1
    • Microsoft Server 2003, Server 2008, Server 2008 R2, Server 2012, and Server 2012 R2

    Overview

    A remote escalation of privilege vulnerability exists in implementations of Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC) in Microsoft Windows which could allow a remote attacker to take control of a vulnerable system. [1]

    Description

    The Microsoft Windows Kerberos KDC fails to properly check service tickets for valid signatures, which can allow aspects of the service ticket to be forged. The improper check allows an attacker to escalate valid domain user account privileges to those of a domain administrator account, which renders the entire domain vulnerable to compromise.

    At the time this release was issued, Microsoft was aware of limited, targeted attacks attempting to exploit this vulnerability.

    Impact

    A valid domain user can pass invalid domain administrator credentials, gain access and compromise any system on the domain, including the domain controller. [2]

    Solution

    An update is available from Microsoft. Please see Microsoft Security Bulletin MS14-068 and Microsoft Research Security and Defense Blog for more details, and apply the necessary updates.[1, 3

    References

    Revision History

    • November 19, 2014: Initial Draft
    • November 25, 2014: Revised formatting

    This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.


  • Nov 14, 2014 10:42:35 PM
    Original release date: November 14, 2014

    Systems Affected

    • Microsoft Windows Vista, 7, 8, 8.1, RT, and RT 8.1
    • Microsoft Server 2003, Server 2008, Server 2008 R2, Server 2012, and Server 2012 R2

    Overview

    A vulnerability in Microsoft Windows Object Linking and Embedding (OLE) could allow remote code execution if a user views a specially-crafted web page in Internet Explorer.[1]

    Description

    The Microsoft Windows OLE OleAut32.dll library provides the SafeArrayRedim function that allows resizing of SAFEARRAY objects in memory.[2] In certain circumstances, this library does not properly check sizes of arrays when an error occurs. The improper size allows an attacker to manipulate memory in a way that can bypass the Internet Explorer Enhanced Protected Mode (EPM) sandbox as well as the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET).

    This vulnerability can be exploited using a specially-crafted web page utilizing VBscript in Internet Explorer. However, it may impact other software that makes use of OleAut32.dll and VBscript.

    Exploit code is publicly available for this vulnerability. Additional details may be found in CERT/CC Vulnerability Note VU#158647.

    Impact

    Arbitrary code can be run on the computer with user privileges. If the user is an administrator, the attacker may run arbitrary code as an administrator, fully compromising the system. 

    Solution

    An update is available from Microsoft.[3] Please see Microsoft Security Bulletin MS14-064 for more details and mitigation guidance, and apply the necessary updates.

    References

    Revision History

    • November 14, 2014: Initial Release

    This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.


  • Nov 14, 2014 3:32:02 PM
    Original release date: November 14, 2014

    Systems Affected

    • Microsoft Windows Vista, 7, 8, 8.1, RT, and RT 8.1
    • Microsoft Server 2003, Server 2008, Server 2008 R2, Server 2012, and Server 2012 R2

    Microsoft Windows XP and 2000 may also be affected.

    Overview

    A critical vulnerability in Microsoft Windows systems could allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via specially crafted network traffic.[1]

    Description

    Microsoft Secure Channel (Schannel) is a security package that provides SSL and TLS on Microsoft Windows platforms.[2, 3] Due to a flaw in Schannel, a remote attacker could execute arbitrary code on both client and server applications.[1]

    It may be possible for exploitation to occur without authentication and via unsolicited network traffic. According to Microsoft MS14-066, there are no known mitigations or workarounds.[2]

    Microsoft patches are typically reverse-engineered and exploits developed in a matter of days or weeks.[4] An anonymous Pastebin user has threatened to publish an exploit on Friday, November 14, 2014.[5]

    Impact

    This flaw allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code and fully compromise vulnerable systems.[6]

    Solution

    Microsoft has released Security Bulletin MS14-066 to address this vulnerability in supported operating systems.[2]

    References

    Revision History

    • November 14, 2014: Initial Release

    This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.


  • Nov 13, 2014 2:17:34 PM
    Original release date: November 13, 2014 | Last revised: November 17, 2014

    Systems Affected

    iOS devices running iOS 7.1.1, 7.1.2, 8.0, 8.1, and 8.1.1 beta.

    Overview

    A technique labeled “Masque Attack” allows an attacker to substitute malware for a legitimate iOS app under a limited set of circumstances.

    Description

    Masque Attack was described by FireEye mobile security researchers [1], Stefan Esser of SektionEins, and Jonathan Zdziarski. This attack works by luring users to install an app from a source other than the iOS App Store or their organizations’ provisioning system. In order for the attack to succeed, a user must install an untrusted app, such as one delivered through a phishing link.  

    This technique takes advantage of a security weakness that allows an untrusted app—with the same “bundle identifier” as that of a legitimate app—to replace the legitimate app on an affected device, while keeping all of the user’s data. This vulnerability exists because iOS does not enforce matching certificates for apps with the same bundle identifier. Apple’s own iOS platform apps, such as Mobile Safari, are not vulnerable.

    Impact

    An app installed on an iOS device using this technique may:

    • Mimic the original app’s login interface to steal the victim’s login credentials.
    • Access sensitive data from local data caches.
    • Perform background monitoring of the user’s device.
    • Gain root privileges to the iOS device.
    • Be indistinguishable from a genuine app.

    Solution

    iOS users can protect themselves from Masque Attacks by following three steps:

    1. Don’t install apps from sources other than Apple’s official App Store or your own organization.
    2. Don’t click “Install” from a third-party pop-up when viewing a web page.
    3. When opening an app, if iOS shows an “Untrusted App Developer” alert, click on “Don’t Trust” and uninstall the app immediately.

    Further details on Masque Attack and mitigation guidance can be found on FireEye’s blog [1]. US-CERT does not endorse or support any particular product or vendor.

    References

    Revision History

    • November 13, 2014: Initial Release
    • November 17, 2014: Vulnerability attribution amended

    This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.


  • Nov 10, 2014 12:19:01 PM
    Original release date: November 10, 2014

    Systems Affected

    Microsoft Windows Server 2003 operating system

    Overview

    Microsoft is ending support for the Windows Server 2003 operating system on July 14, 2015.[1] After this date, this product will no longer receive:

    • Security patches that help protect PCs from harmful viruses, spyware, and other malicious software
    • Assisted technical support from Microsoft
    • Software and content updates

    Description

    All software products have a lifecycle. End of support refers to the date when Microsoft will no longer provide automatic fixes, updates, or online technical assistance.[2] As of July 2014, there were 12 million physical servers worldwide still running Windows Server 2003.[3]

    Impact

    Computer systems running unsupported software are exposed to an elevated risk to cybersecurity dangers, such as malicious attacks or electronic data loss.

    Users may also encounter problems with software and hardware compatibility since new software applications and hardware devices may not be built for Windows Server 2003.

    Organizations that are governed by regulatory obligations may find they are no longer able to satisfy compliance requirements while running Windows Server 2003.

    Solution

    Computers running the Windows Server 2003 operating system will continue to work after support ends. However, using unsupported software may increase the risks of viruses and other security threats. Negative consequences could include loss of confidentiality, integrity, and or availability of data, system resources and business assets.

    The Microsoft "Microsoft Support Lifecycle Policy FAQ" page offers additional details.[2]

    Users have the option to upgrade to a currently supported operating system or other cloud-based services. There are software vendors and service providers in the marketplace who offer assistance in migrating from Windows Server 2003 to a currently supported operating system or SaaS (software as a service) / IaaS (infrastructure as a service) products and services.[4,5] US-CERT does not endorse or support any particular product or vendor.

    References

    Revision History

    • November 10, 2014: Initial Release

    This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.


  • Oct 27, 2014 4:10:20 PM
    Original release date: October 27, 2014 | Last revised: October 28, 2014

    Systems Affected

    Microsoft Windows

    Overview

    Since mid-October 2014, a phishing campaign has targeted a wide variety of recipients while employing the Dyre/Dyreza banking malware. Elements of this phishing campaign vary from target to target including senders, attachments, exploits, themes, and payload(s).[1][2] Although this campaign uses various tactics, the actor’s intent is to entice recipients into opening attachments and downloading malware.

    Description

    The Dyre banking malware specifically targets sensitive user account credentials. The malware has the ability to capture user login information and send the captured data to malicious actors.[3] Phishing emails used in this campaign often contain a weaponized PDF attachment which attempts to exploit vulnerabilities found in unpatched versions of Adobe Reader.[4][5] After successful exploitation, a user's system will download Dyre banking malware. All of the major anti-virus vendors have successfully detected this malware prior to the release of this alert.[6]

    Please note, the below listing of indicators does not represent all characteristics and indicators for this campaign.

    Phishing Email Characteristics:

    • Subject: "Unpaid invoic" (Spelling errors in the subject line are a characteristic of this campaign)
    • Attachment: Invoice621785.pdf

    System Level Indicators (upon successful exploitation):

    • Copies itself under C:\Windows\[RandomName].exe
    • Created a Service named "Google Update Service" by setting the following registry keys:
      • HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\googleupdate\ImagePath: "C:\WINDOWS\pfdOSwYjERDHrdV.exe"
      • HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\googleupdate\DisplayName: "Google Update Service"[7]

    Impact

    A system infected with Dyre banking malware will attempt to harvest credentials for online services, including banking services.

    Solution

    Users and administrators are recommended to take the following preventive measures to protect their computer networks from phishing campaigns:

    US-CERT collects phishing email messages and website locations so that we can help people avoid becoming victims of phishing scams.

    You can report phishing to us by sending email to phishing-report@us-cert.gov.

    References

    Revision History

    • October 27, 2014: Initial Release
    • October 28, 2014: Added Reference 7 in Description Section

    This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.


  • Oct 22, 2014 9:28:18 PM
    Original release date: October 22, 2014 | Last revised: October 24, 2014

    Systems Affected

    Microsoft Windows

    Overview

    Ransomware is a type of malicious software (malware) that infects a computer and restricts access to it until a ransom is paid to unlock it. This Alert is the result of Canadian Cyber Incident Response Centre (CCIRC) analysis in coordination with the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to provide further information about crypto ransomware, specifically to:

    • Present its main characteristics, explain the prevalence of ransomware, and the proliferation of crypto ransomware variants; and
    • Provide prevention and mitigation information.

    Description

    WHAT IS RANSOMWARE?

    Ransomware is a type of malware that infects a computer and restricts a user’s access to the infected computer. This type of malware, which has now been observed for several years, attempts to extort money from victims by displaying an on-screen alert. These alerts often state that their computer has been locked or that all of their files have been encrypted, and demand that a ransom is paid to restore access. This ransom is typically in the range of $100–$300 dollars, and is sometimes demanded in virtual currency, such as Bitcoin.

    Ransomware is typically spread through phishing emails that contain malicious attachments and drive-by downloading. Drive-by downloading occurs when a user unknowingly visits an infected website and malware is downloaded and installed without their knowledge. Crypto ransomware, a variant that encrypts files, is typically spread through similar methods, and has been spread through Web-based instant messaging applications.

    WHY IS IT SO EFFECTIVE?

    The authors of ransomware instill fear and panic into their victims, causing them to click on a link or pay a ransom, and inevitably become infected with additional malware, including messages similar to those below:

    • “Your computer has been infected with a virus. Click here to resolve the issue.”
    • “Your computer was used to visit websites with illegal content. To unlock your computer, you must pay a $100 fine.”
    • “All files on your computer have been encrypted. You must pay this ransom within 72 hours to regain access to your data.”

    PROLIFERATION OF VARIANTS

    In 2012, Symantec, using data from a command and control (C2) server of 5,700 computers compromised in one day, estimated that approximately 2.9 percent of those compromised users paid the ransom. With an average ransom of $200, this meant malicious actors profited $33,600 per day, or $394,400 per month, from a single C2 server. These rough estimates demonstrate how profitable ransomware can be for malicious actors.

    This financial success has likely led to a proliferation of ransomware variants. In 2013, more destructive and lucrative ransomware variants were introduced including Xorist, CryptorBit, and CryptoLocker. Some variants encrypt not just the files on the infected device but also the contents of shared or networked drives. These variants are considered destructive because they encrypt user’s and organization’s files, and render them useless until criminals receive a ransom.

    Additional variants observed in 2014 included CryptoDefense and Cryptowall, which are also considered destructive. Reports indicate that CryptoDefense and Cryptowall share the same code, and that only the name of malware itself is different. Similar to CryptoLocker, these variants also encrypt files on the local computer, shared network files, and removable media.

    LINKS TO OTHER TYPES OF MALWARE

    Systems infected with ransomware are also often infected with other malware. In the case of CryptoLocker, a user typically becomes infected by opening a malicious attachment from an email. This malicious attachment contains Upatre, a downloader, which infects the user with GameOver Zeus. GameOver Zeus is a variant of the Zeus Trojan that steals banking information and is also used to steal other types of data. Once a system is infected with GameOver Zeus, Upatre will also download CryptoLocker. Finally, CryptoLocker encrypts files on the infected system, and requests that a ransom be paid.

    The close ties between ransomware and other types of malware were demonstrated through the recent botnet disruption operation against GameOver Zeus, which also proved effective against CryptoLocker. In June 2014, an international law enforcement operation successfully weakened the infrastructure of both GameOver Zeus and CryptoLocker.

    Impact

    Ransomware doesn’t only target home users; businesses can also become infected with ransomware, which can have negative consequences, including:

    • Temporary or permanent loss of sensitive or proprietary information;
    • Disruption to regular operations;
    • Financial losses incurred to restore systems and files; and
    • Potential harm to an organization’s reputation.

    Paying the ransom does not guarantee the encrypted files will be released; it only guarantees that the malicious actors receive the victim’s money, and in some cases, their banking information. In addition, decrypting files does not mean the malware infection itself has been removed.

    Solution

    Infections can be devastating to an individual or organization, and recovery can be a difficult process that may require the services of a reputable data recovery specialist.

    US-CERT and CCIRC recommend users and administrators take the following preventive measures to protect their computer networks from ransomware infection:

    • Perform regular backups of all critical information to limit the impact of data or system loss and to help expedite the recovery process. Ideally, this data should be kept on a separate device, and backups should be stored offline.
    • Maintain up-to-date anti-virus software.
    • Keep your operating system and software up-to-date with the latest patches.
    • Do not follow unsolicited web links in email. Refer to the Security Tip Avoiding Social Engineering and Phishing Attacks for more information on social engineering attacks.
    • Use caution when opening email attachments. For information on safely handling email attachments, see Recognizing and Avoiding Email Scams.
    • Follow safe practices when browsing the web. See Good Security Habits and Safeguarding Your Data for additional details.

    Individuals or organizations are not encouraged to pay the ransom, as this does not guarantee files will be released. Report instances of fraud to the FBI at the Internet Crime Complaint Center or contact the CCIRC .

    References

    Revision History

    • October 22, 2014: Initial Release
    • October 24, 2014: Minor edit to the reference section

    This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.


  • Oct 17, 2014 4:27:32 PM
    Original release date: October 17, 2014 | Last revised: December 10, 2014

    Systems Affected

    All systems and applications utilizing the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) 3.0 with cipher-block chaining (CBC) mode ciphers may be vulnerable. However, the POODLE (Padding Oracle On Downgraded Legacy Encryption) attack demonstrates this vulnerability using web browsers and web servers, which is one of the most likely exploitation scenarios.

    Some Transport Layer Security (TLS) implementations are also vulnerable to the POODLE attack.

    Overview

    US-CERT is aware of a design vulnerability found in the way SSL 3.0 handles block cipher mode padding. The POODLE attack demonstrates how an attacker can exploit this vulnerability to decrypt and extract information from inside an encrypted transaction.

    Description

    The SSL 3.0 vulnerability stems from the way blocks of data are encrypted under a specific type of encryption algorithm within the SSL protocol. The POODLE attack takes advantage of the protocol version negotiation feature built into SSL/TLS to force the use of SSL 3.0 and then leverages this new vulnerability to decrypt select content within the SSL session. The decryption is done byte by byte and will generate a large number of connections between the client and server.

    While SSL 3.0 is an old encryption standard and has generally been replaced by TLS, most SSL/TLS implementations remain backwards compatible with SSL 3.0 to interoperate with legacy systems in the interest of a smooth user experience. Even if a client and server both support a version of TLS the SSL/TLS protocol suite allows for protocol version negotiation (being referred to as the “downgrade dance” in other reporting). The POODLE attack leverages the fact that when a secure connection attempt fails, servers will fall back to older protocols such as SSL 3.0. An attacker who can trigger a connection failure can then force the use of SSL 3.0 and attempt the new attack. [1]

    Two other conditions must be met to successfully execute the POODLE attack: 1) the attacker must be able to control portions of the client side of the SSL connection (varying the length of the input) and 2) the attacker must have visibility of the resulting ciphertext. The most common way to achieve these conditions would be to act as Man-in-the-Middle (MITM), requiring a whole separate form of attack to establish that level of access.

    These conditions make successful exploitation somewhat difficult. Environments that are already at above-average risk for MITM attacks (such as public WiFi) remove some of those challenges.

    On December 8, 2014, it was publicly reported [2,3,4] that some TLS implementations are also vulnerable to the POODLE attack.

    Impact

    The POODLE attack can be used against any system or application that supports SSL 3.0 with CBC mode ciphers. This affects most current browsers and websites, but also includes any software that either references a vulnerable SSL/TLS library (e.g. OpenSSL) or implements the SSL/TLS protocol suite itself. By exploiting this vulnerability in a likely web-based scenario, an attacker can gain access to sensitive data passed within the encrypted web session, such as passwords, cookies and other authentication tokens that can then be used to gain more complete access to a website (impersonating that user, accessing database content, etc.).

    Solution

    There is currently no fix for the vulnerability SSL 3.0 itself, as the issue is fundamental to the protocol; however, disabling SSL 3.0 support in system/application configurations is the most viable solution currently available.

    Some of the same researchers that discovered the vulnerability also developed a fix for one of the prerequisite conditions; TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV is a protocol extension that prevents MITM attackers from being able to force a protocol downgrade. OpenSSL has added support for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV to their latest versions and recommend the following upgrades: [5]

    • OpenSSL 1.0.1 users should upgrade to 1.0.1j.
    • OpenSSL 1.0.0 users should upgrade to 1.0.0o.
    • OpenSSL 0.9.8 users should upgrade to 0.9.8zc.

    Both clients and servers need to support TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV to prevent downgrade attacks.

    Other SSL 3.0 implementations are most likely also affected by POODLE. Contact your vendor for details. Additional vendor information may be available in the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) entry for CVE-2014-3566 [6] or in CERT Vulnerability Note VU#577193.[7]

    Vulnerable TLS implementations need to be updated. CVE ID assignments and vendor information are also available in the NVD.[8]

    References

    Revision History

    • October 17, 2014 Initial Release
    • October 20, 2014 Added CERT Vulnerability Note VU#577193 to the Solution section
    • December 10, 2014 Noted newer POODLE variant (CVE-2014-8730)

    This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.


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